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 3 
ABSTRACT 4 
By ignoring the opportunity cost of water use, water is undervalued, which can lead to significant 5 
errors in investments and water allocation decisions. The marginal resource opportunity cost 6 
(MROC) varies in time and space, as resource availability, demands, and users’ WTP vary. This 7 
spatial and temporal variability can only be captured by basinwide hydro-economic models 8 
integrating water demands and environmental requirements, resources, infrastructure, and 9 
operational and institutional restrictions. This paper presents a method for the simulation of water 10 
pricing policies linked to water availability, and the design of efficient pricing policies that 11 
incorporate the basinwide marginal value of water. Two approaches were applied: priority-based 12 
simulation and economic optimization. The improvement in economic efficiency was assessed by 13 
comparing the results from simulation of the current system operation and the pricing schedule. 14 
The difference between the benefits for the simulated current management and the upper bound 15 
benefits from optimization indicates the maximum gap that could be bridged with pricing. In the 16 
application to a synthetic case, a storage-dependent step pricing schedule derived from average 17 
MROC values led to benefits that capture 80% of the gap of net benefits between management 18 
without pricing and the economically optimal management. Different pricing policies were 19 
tested, depending not only on reservoir storage but also on previous inflows. The results show 20 
that the method is useful for designing pricing policies that enhance the economic benefits, 21 
leading to more efficient resource allocations over time and across the competing uses.  22 
Keywords:  Water pricing; River basin management; Optimization; scarcity pricing; opportunity 23 
cost  24 
 INTRODUCTION. WATER OPPORTUNITY COST 25 
Of all the tools available for solving water scarcity problems, better pricing is probably the most 26 
underutilized relative to its potential (Griffin 2006: 269). That water is often underpriced is 27 
widely evident: quantity demanded frequently exceeds supply, often leading to a nonsustainable 28 
use of the resources. Properly managed, this instrument has the potential to promote improved 29 
economic efficiency (Rogers et al. 2002). Several international institutions have recently 30 
promoted the application of the principle of full cost recovery and many countries are now 31 
engaged in some form of pricing reform (OECD 1999, Dinar 2000). One recent institutional 32 
attempt to design an efficient pricing system is the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD, 33 
European Commission 2000). The WFD requires the implementation of a pricing policy that 34 
provides incentives for efficient water use, contributing to the environmental objectives (a good 35 
water status for all natural water), and ensures an adequate contribution of the various water uses 36 
to the recovery of water service costs. The design of methods for implementing those principles 37 
has produced considerable debate (WATECO 2002; Heinz et al. 2007; Iglesias and Blanco 2008).  38 
The cost of water has two broad components: the cost of its provision and its opportunity cost, or 39 
the value of the forgone option resulting from a water management/allocation decision. There is 40 
always an opportunity cost if there is water scarcity, either in quantity or quality, since its use 41 
involves a sacrifice to alternative uses. From the point of view of managing water as an economic 42 
resource, the key challenge is to ensure that this cost is considered in resource allocation 43 
decisions (Griffin 2001). Users should get a signal of water’s opportunity costs so that they 44 
behave accordingly. By ignoring this resource opportunity cost, water is undervalued, which can 45 
lead to significant errors in investments and water allocation among users. When the price of 46 
water reflects its marginal cost, the resource will be put to its highest-valued uses and an optimal 47 
resource allocation would be reached, for which the marginal productivity of water would be 48 
equal across the different uses and over time and society’s economic welfare would be 49 
maximized. Despite the apparent simplicity of the concept, measuring the opportunity costs of 50 
scarce water is difficult. Since water markets are usually absent or inefficient, scarcity values go 51 
frequently unrecognized, and the assessment of these opportunity costs requires a systems 52 
approach and a proper method to estimate the value of water for the different users in the system 53 
to develop shadow prices reflecting the value of water (Young 2005: 15; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 54 
2008). Scarcity values in water use can arise at the spatial scale, from intersectoral competition at 55 
a certain time (i.e., from economically inefficient spatial allocation of scarce existing resources) 56 
or at the temporal scale, by inefficient water allocation over time (when making decisions on the 57 
 use of a certain water stock now or in the future). The term “marginal user cost” has been also 58 
applied in the economic literature of depletable resources to refer to the discounted value of 59 
sacrificed future uses (Tietenberg 2000:90; Griffin 2001): there is a trade-off between current and 60 
future net benefits. In addition, when infrastructure capacity is binding, there is a third 61 
opportunity cost to contemplate: the marginal capacity cost. Turvey (1976) defined the “marginal 62 
capital cost of water supply” as the cost savings from postponing a capacity addition scheme. 63 
Newlin et al. (2002) and other subsequent applications of the CALVIN hydro-economic 64 
optimization model (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2004; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2004; Medellin-Azuara et 65 
al. 2009) have analyzed the marginal value of additional water supplies and infrastructure using 66 
an spatially intense model of water allocation in the intertied water supply system of California.  67 
An optimal pricing scheme under the goal of deriving the greatest value from scarce water should 68 
include not only the marginal cost of water supply, but also the three components of the 69 
“nonaccounting” opportunity costs: the basinwide marginal value of water at the source, the 70 
“marginal user cost” or opportunity cost of water use over time, and the marginal capacity cost 71 
from limited infrastructure (Griffin 2001). Since opportunity cost depends on the alternative uses, 72 
an integrated basinwide approach is needed to account for all major competing water uses in the 73 
basin. This paper presents a new method for the simulation of different water pricing policies 74 
linked to water availability (or relative scarcity) in the basin, and the design of efficient water 75 
pricing policies that incorporate the marginal basinwide value of the resource. The approach is 76 
based on the systematic assessment of the basinwide marginal resource opportunity cost of water 77 
(MROC), an indicator of the aggregated economic impact of water scarcity and how much the 78 
users would be willing to pay (WTP) to mitigate that scarcity. The MROC varies dynamically in 79 
time and space, as resource availability, demands, and users’ WTP vary. This spatial and 80 
temporal variability can only be captured by basinwide hydro-economic models integrating water 81 
demands, resources, and infrastructure, and operational and institutional restrictions.  82 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MARGINAL RESOURCE OPPORTUNITY COST (MROC) 83 
The EU WFD integrates economics into water management and policy making. According to the 84 
Directive, Member States must implement a pricing policy that provides adequate incentives for 85 
efficient water use and ensures adequate contribution of the different water uses to the recovery 86 
of the cost of water services, including environmental and resource costs. Despite its key role in 87 
the design of such a pricing policy, the definition and assessment method of resource and 88 
environmental costs remains controversial and is one of the main issues regarding the 89 
implementation of the WFD that requires further methodological development (WATECO 2002; 90 
 Brouwer 2004; Heinz et al. 2007). 91 
Pulido-Velazquez et al. (2006) proposed the term marginal resource opportunity cost (MROC) 92 
at a specific location and time to refer to the systemwide cost or forgone net benefit of having 93 
available one additional unit less of resource at that location and time. This shadow value varies 94 
dynamically in time and space, and represents the marginal economic value of natural (raw) 95 
water at the source, considering the intersectoral competition of water allocation in space and 96 
over time. Its assessment requires to simultaneously consider the value of water for all alternative 97 
water uses in the basin, as well as the system’s variable operating costs. For that purpose, an 98 
integrated basinwide hydro-economic model is needed. Integrated hydro-economic models have 99 
to be capable to properly reproduce the physical behavior of the system, with a realistic 100 
representation of the spatial and temporal variability of surface and groundwater resources, while 101 
simultaneously incorporating the value of water for the different alternative uses in the basin 102 
(Lund et al. 2006; Harou et al. 2009).The results of these models capture the spatial and temporal 103 
variability of supply and demands, taking into account resource availability, storage capacity, 104 
losses, return flows, and marginal WTP or economic value at each water use, as well as the 105 
operation of the infrastructure. This representation allows the dynamic assessment of the 106 
marginal economic value of water (or MROC) at different locations in the basin (Newlin et al. 107 
2002; Fisher et al. 2002; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2004, 2006, and 2007). Two complementary 108 
approaches can be followed for analyzing water management in a water resource system: 109 
simulation and optimization. By defining the objective function as the total net benefit from water 110 
allocation, the optimization approach obtains the MROC as the shadow prices of the 111 
optimization; these results correspond to the economically optimal water allocation. On the 112 
contrary, the simulation approach assumes that the system is managed according to a set of 113 
operating rules and constraints that represents the current modus operandi of the system.  114 
MROC assessment using priority-based Simulation 115 
As competition for water resources increases, so does the need of an institutional framework 116 
governing regional water allocation. Institutional criteria are often more influential than physical 117 
or economic factors in determining flow allocation among uses. This ‘‘institutional framework’’ 118 
often refers to water use priorities as specified by the existing water-rights structure (Israel and 119 
Lund 2000). However, water rights are not necessarily the only prioritized water uses in a system, 120 
but also other uses as environmental or recreational uses can gain this stature.  121 
Simulation or descriptive models are often the best approach for assessing the system 122 
 performance for alternative strategies (“what if” scenarios), permitting a more detailed and 123 
realistic representation of the complex characteristic of a river system. In the simulation 124 
approach, water is allocated in accordance with a set of operating rules and priorities, which are 125 
defined with the aim to reproduce the current institutional framework in modelling efforts. Multi-126 
period simulation models utilize optimization (often network flow programming) for determining 127 
operating decisions at each time step (e.g., Sigvaldason 1976; Labadie 1995; Andreu et al. 1996; 128 
Wurb 2005). Unlike multi-period optimization models, the simulation models can reproduce the 129 
actual operating rules of the system with reservoir releases based on existing storage without 130 
anticipating future inflows (avoiding the perfect foresight issues inherent to multi-period 131 
optimization), and replicate water allocation decisions based on water rights and priorities. This is 132 
usually accomplished by introducing certain unit cost coefficients that preserve priority ranks 133 
(Israel and Lund 2000). Unlike the optimization approach, the economic indicators provide 134 
insight on economic inefficiencies but do not drive water allocation. These models are better 135 
suitable to reproduce the modus operandi of the system under the current institutional setting.  136 
The marginal economic value of raw water (or MROC) can be determined in simulation by 137 
assessing the impact on water use of a small change in streamflow, and then applying economic 138 
value estimates to the water use changes (e.g., Brown 1990; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2006). The 139 
simulation approach that we propose is conceptually simple and consists of three steps:  140 
 Setting-up a simulation model of water management in the basin, in which all the relevant 141 
components (surface and groundwater resources, infrastructure, demands, etc.) are included. 142 
The model must be capable of reproducing current allocation rules and modus operandi.  143 
 Economic assessment of the resulting resource allocation determined by the model. This 144 
assessment requires economic functions for the different modeled elements, representing the 145 
unit cost/benefit that flow, storage or delivery to each element generate. The simulation of the 146 
system for a given hydrologic scenario is named as the Base Case. 147 
 Use of specific routines for the sequential and iterative use of the previous models to obtain 148 
the resource costs. A Modified Case corresponds to the simulation with the same hydrologic 149 
scenario and a perturbation by adding (or removing) a differential water volume (Volume) at 150 
the location and time of interest. Thereafter, the model reallocates the resource over time and 151 
space, using the operating rules, yielding a new economic benefit. The difference in total 152 
benefit between the Base and the Modified Case (Benefit) is computed. The ratio 153 
Benefit/Volume is an approximation of the aggregated MROC for the system, and reflects 154 
 the aggregated economic cost of water scarcity with the existing allocation criteria.  155 
Hydro-economic models can be developed “ad hoc” for a specific system or using generic 156 
Decision Support System (DSS) tools. AQUATOOL is a generalized DSS for integrated water 157 
resources planning and management, including conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. 158 
Computer-assisted design modules allow to represent any complex water resource system in a 159 
graphical form, giving access to geographically referenced databases and knowledge bases. New 160 
modules of the DSS AQUATOOL (Andreu et al., 1996) add tools for the economic assessment of 161 
water management in the system (Collazos, 2004; Andreu et al. 2005; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 162 
2008). Hydro-economic simulation in DSS AQUATOOL is performed in 2 steps: 163 
 First, the priority-based simulation module of AQUATOOL (Simges) is used to calculate 164 
monthly water allocation time series, and determine deliveries to the demands, deficits, and 165 
reliability of meeting each demand and environmental flow requirements.  166 
 Secondly, the economic simulation module, EcoWin, is used to assess the benefits and 167 
scarcity costs (or economic losses) at each demand and aggregated for the basin, based on 168 
economic demand curves and operating costs. The iterative procedure mentioned above is 169 
then used to compute the MROC from simulation 170 
The MROC obtained by the iterative simulation procedure described represent a first 171 
approximation to the marginal value of water in the system in that location over time. In the case 172 
of simulation, these values are conditioned to certain operating rules and priorities in the target 173 
demands that determine water allocation at each time step. It represents a positive (descriptive) 174 
valuation of the MROC corresponding to a certain modus operandi of the system. 175 
MROC assessment using Economic Optimization 176 
 In an optimization model, the optimal values of the dual variables, Lagrange multipliers, or 177 
shadow prices reproduce directly the change in the optimal value of the objective function as a 178 
consequence of a marginal change in the corresponding constraint. If the objective function 179 
represents the basinwide net benefit from water use, the shadow prices associated with water 180 
balance constraints at certain storage nodes of the flow network of the system (reservoirs, 181 
aquifers) provide the net benefit derived of a unit increase of the resource in that node at that time 182 
(or equivalently, the amount that the system is WTP for one additional unit of water at that 183 
moment and location). Thus, the optimization model provides time series of the marginal value of 184 
water at certain locations in the system, taking into account system-wide effects. The economic 185 
value of water will change over time and space depending on water scarcity and water demands. 186 
 The resulting MROC can be used to obtain an indicator of the resource/scarcity opportunity cost 187 
(Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2006 and 2008; Heinz et al. 2007). According to the economic theory, an 188 
optimal efficient water pricing policy would have to include this resource opportunity cost 189 
component, so that signals of water scarcity and the resource value are sent to the users. Since the 190 
MROC is calculated for the economically optimal system operation, these values represent the 191 
maximum (ideal) marginal economic value of one additional unit of water in the reservoir for the 192 
users in the system. This shadow value is thus equivalent to the maximum price that users at that 193 
location who value additional water the most would just be WTP for an additional cubic meter of 194 
water, given the optimal flows of the model solution (Fisher et al., 2002). Unlike the case of 195 
simulation, this MROC value corresponds to a normative valuation: the results from the 196 
optimization model indicate the maximum attainable economic efficiency. The distance between 197 
the benefits from the simulated current management and the maximum benefits obtained from 198 
optimization indicates the maximum profit gap that could be bridged with pricing policies. 199 
There is also certain disturbing effect from optimization. The system operation is optimized for 200 
long hydrologic times, what means that the optimization is performed with perfect knowledge of 201 
future hydrology, what is known as the “perfect foresight” issue (Labadie 1997). The perfect 202 
foresight inherent to the deterministic optimization procedure overestimates the efficiency 203 
attained, representing an ideal upper bound of what can be achieved with realistic hydrology 204 
forecasts (Draper and Lund 2004). Perfect foresight can understate the value of new storage and 205 
conveyance capacity and underestimate actual scarcity and scarcity cost (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 206 
2004, 2008). But the effects of perfect foresight on the overall performance of the system can be 207 
small when improved performance comes predominantly from consistent operation and 208 
allocation changes that do not require hydrologic foresight (Newlin et al. 2002).  209 
METHOD AND TOOLS FOR DESIGNING EFFICIENT PRICING POLICIES 210 
INCLUDING BASINWIDE MROC 211 
The resulting time series of MROC at the main reservoirs of the system can be used as the 212 
starting point for the design of basinwide efficient water pricing policies integrating marginal 213 
resource (scarcity) opportunity costs. When there is a reasonable correlation between reservoir 214 
storage and MROC at the reservoir, a step pricing schedule can be derived from average MROC 215 
values for different storage volumes. In this way, the price represents the average marginal 216 
opportunity cost of water use related to certain water availability in the system. The proposed 217 
methodology is based on the combined use of simulation and optimization hydro-economic 218 
 models at the basin/water resource system scale. The method involves the following steps: 219 
1) Setting-up a simulation model of water management in the basin. This model should 220 
integrate resources, demands, and infrastructure, with a realistic representation of the legal, 221 
institutional, environmental, and operational constraints. Once a conceptual model of the 222 
system is developed, some key inputs are: configuration of the flow network, facility 223 
capacities and operating rules, surface hydrology (represented by long inflow time series), 224 
losses and return flow equations, aquifer dynamics and stream-aquifer interaction, 225 
environmental water requirements (often imposed as instream flow constraints), and water 226 
demands (as fixed supply targets to be satisfied).  227 
2) Economic characterization of the system. Hydro-economic models require empirically 228 
estimated marginal supply cost and benefit functions (or demand curves) for each alternative 229 
water demands/uses at the basin (Harou et al. 2009). 230 
3) Priority-based simulation of water management in the system.  In river basin models, water 231 
flow is basically simulated over space and time through mass balance or continuity equations 232 
at the nodes with (reservoirs, aquifers) or without storage capacity. The simulation will yield 233 
time series of flow, storage, delivery and water supply deficit (convertible into scarcity costs) 234 
and reliability for all the system over the simulated time horizon. Herein, scarcity cost at 235 
each water use (demand) is defined as the benefit forgone when deliveries are less than the 236 
maximum demanded by each user (Newlin et al. 2002; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2006). 237 
4) Calculation of the time series of MROC at the main reservoirs of the system using 238 
simulation. The MROC at the reservoirs is obtained by applying the iterative procedure 239 
previously described. 240 
5) Setting an economic optimization model for the system. In this case, the objective will be to 241 
maximize the aggregated net benefit from water use over the optimization time horizon, 242 
subject to the physical, environmental, institutional, and operational constraints.  243 
6) Economic optimization of water management in the system. The optimization will yield time 244 
series of flow, storage, delivery and water supply deficit (convertible into scarcity costs) for 245 
all the system over the optimized time horizon.  246 
7) Calculation of the time series of MROC at the main reservoirs of the system by optimization. 247 
The shadow value associated to the reservoirs’ mass balance equations directly provides 248 
MROC times series in optimization.  249 
8) Analysis of net benefits and MROC from simulation and economic optimization. The 250 
distance between the benefits from simulation with the current management and the 251 
 maximum benefits obtained from the optimization indicates the profit gap that can be 252 
bridged by the pricing policies.  253 
9) Proposal of pricing policies based on simulation/optimization MROC. A storage-dependent 254 
step function is obtained by sorting and averaging the MROC values at different storage 255 
intervals for a certain reservoir in the system. Other different pricing policies are also tested.       256 
10)  Simulation of economic results for different pricing policies. Improved aggregated economic 257 
efficiency resulting from the application of pricing policies is assessed by comparing the 258 
results obtained by simulating the current operation of the system with those obtained with 259 
the simulation of the pricing policy. The use of simulation for assessing the efficiency 260 
improvements from the tested pricing policies avoids the perfect foresight issue inherent to 261 
multi-period optimization models (as discussed in the previous section). The results from the 262 
optimization model indicate the maximum attainable economic efficiency.  263 
It is assumed that users react to price changes according to microeconomic theory, either as 264 
profit-maxing producers or as utility maximizing consumers. The change in water use for a 265 
change in price will be given by the corresponding demand (marginal benefits) functions (point 266 
2). When water reserves in the system are scarce, a high price in the step-pricing function will 267 
lead to a reduction in the target demand for each use. In this way, the step-pricing function will 268 
act as a kind of system operating rule, in which reservoir releases are modified through variations 269 
in the quantity demanded (the target demand of the simulation model) under scarcity conditions. 270 
The reduction in the quantity demanded will be not equal across uses, but it will rather vary 271 
according to each demand curve, so that the reduction will be greater in percentage terms for the 272 
low-value uses. This will ensure than, when water is scarce, it will be mainly used by the high-273 
value uses. The temporal dimension of water opportunity cost is also implicitly considered in the 274 
time series of MROC, and so, it is somehow embedded into the design of the pricing policy. 275 
The practical implementation of this method was done with the coordinated use of different 276 
modules of the generalized DSS AQUATOOL. The priority-based simulation module, SIMGES, 277 
was used to simulate the basinwide effect of the pricing policy on the time series of storage, flow, 278 
supply, and deficit of supply. The model applies an optimization algorithm to deal with monthly 279 
decisions of water allocation among the different competing uses, minimizing the weighted 280 
deviations from the target. The weights are defined consequently with the priorities given to each 281 
demand (Andreu et al. 1996). The economic postprocessor, ECOWIN, then uses the operating 282 
cost and demand functions to convert the time series of water delivered into net benefits and 283 
scarcity costs for each demand and aggregated for the whole system. The storage-dependent step 284 
 pricing policy is simulated in SIMGES by translating the level of water usage restrictions at each 285 
level of price into a coefficient of restrictions to be applied to each target demand depending on 286 
the status of reservoir storage at the beginning of each simulation period. 287 
APPLICATION 288 
A simple synthetic case study has been used to illustrate the method. The system is made up of a 289 
reservoir and 2 demands (A and B) competing for a scarce resource (Fig. 1), with demand A with 290 
the highest priority of supply (this could be the case of urban vs. agricultural demand, or two 291 
irrigation demands with different priorities). The reservoir has a useful storage capacity of 93 292 
Mm
3
 (millions of cubic meters) and dead storage of 2 Mm
3
. Fig. 2 shows the 55-year monthly 293 
inflow time series. The use of long natural inflow time series allows taking into account the 294 
temporal variability of the hydrology, including periods of low flow/droughts and high flow 295 
distributed over time as happened in the past. The economic demand curves are depicted in Fig. 3 296 
(assuming linear demand curves). B is the use with the highest economic value (for a given 297 
supply deficit, scarcity cost will be higher in use B) but with less priority of supply.  298 
Priority-based simulation and economic optimization models 299 
Once the simulation model is implemented using the simulation module of the DSS 300 
AQUATOOL (step 1, previous section), water management is simulated with water allocated to 301 
each  demand in priority order (i.e., first, water is allocated to demand A, and from the remaining 302 
storage, to B). Simulation results include water supply reliability indices, flow, delivery, and 303 
storage time series and other summary statistics (step 3). Scarcity (water supply deficit) and 304 
scarcity costs (forgone net benefits) are calculated over time per demand and aggregated for the 305 
whole system, based on the economic demand curves (step 2) and the time series of deliveries. 306 
The economic module of AQUATOOL, EcoWin, is then used to obtain the marginal economic 307 
value of water at the reservoir (MROC time series, Fig. 4) for simulation (step 4). Fig. 4 shows 308 
that, in agreement with the economic theory, the greatest MROC corresponds to the periods in 309 
which the reservoir is at a minimum (at the dead storage). On the contrary, the marginal value of 310 
water becomes zero when the reservoir is at full capacity (no water scarcity).  311 
The non-linear economic optimization model has been implemented using the optimization 312 
package GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) (Brooke et al. 1998). The economic 313 
optimization model (steps 5-6) maximizes the aggregated net benefit from the two demands (or 314 
what is the same, minimizing scarcity plus variable operating costs) over the time horizon. 315 
Scarcity costs are found by integrating the demand curves from the maximum demand leftward to 316 
 the delivery. The model involves constraints for the maximum and minimum (dead pool) storage 317 
capacity, the minimum environmental instream flow in the last reach of the river, the mass 318 
balance equation at the reservoir, and the mass balance at the delivery node.  319 
Fig. 4 depicts the marginal economic value (MROC) time series at the reservoir for optimization 320 
(step 7). The MROC curve for optimization is more regular and smooth than the one for 321 
simulation, since optimization better allocates water over time reducing the periods of severe 322 
scarcity. The total net benefit is greater for optimization than for simulation (Table 1), given the 323 
optimal water reallocation from use A (higher priority) to use B (higher economic value). The 324 
optimization model significantly reduces the deficit to B and the maximum deficit values for A. 325 
Part of the increase in the total benefit is also due to the optimal management of the system over 326 
time, what allows to significantly reduce the scarcity costs during the main drought events (since 327 
scarcity cost increases non-linearly with the deficit). The distance between the benefits from 328 
simulation with the current management and the maximum benefits obtained from optimization, 329 
in this case, 2.2 M€/year, indicates the profit gap that can be bridged with pricing policies. 330 
Storage-based step pricing function 331 
Fig. 4 represents the MROC and storage time series at the reservoir for simulation and 332 
optimization. The MROC varies over time depending on the relative scarcity in the system 333 
(available resources and demands), but also on the future status of the system. The same storage 334 
does not imply the same MROC, since the value of water also depends on the coming inflows 335 
and future scarcity conditions. An additional unit of water will be used over time according to the 336 
priorities in Simulation, and to the economically optimal operation in Optimization. The 337 
objective is to derive a practical pricing policy using this information (step 9), and to value the 338 
gains in terms of net benefits (step 10). For that purpose, the average MROC values for different 339 
storage intervals are computed, and then used to derive the step pricing schedule, following the 340 
procedure laid out in Fig. 5. In this case, the averaged MROC pricing levels for the Priority-based 341 
Simulation are higher than for Optimization, what it is consistent with the fact that the economic 342 
optimization reduces scarcity costs, leading to a lower marginal value of additional water. The 343 
effect of the pricing schedules derived from the Simulation and the Optimization MROC and 344 
storage time series (Fig. 6) were then simulated by imposing changes in the demanded quantities 345 
at each use according to the demand curves. The results (see Table 2) indicate that the step 346 
pricing schedule derived from average MROC values from simulation leads to economic benefits 347 
that already capture 80% of the gap of total net economic benefits between management without 348 
pricing (based on priorities) and the economically optimal management. By applying the storage-349 
 based pricing functions, the system penalizes water use B and allocates more water to use A (with 350 
higher economic values). In this case we obtained lower total net benefits in the pricing policy 351 
derived from the economic optimization’s averaged MROC.  352 
Optimized storage-dependent step pricing  353 
An alternative for defining an efficient policy would be to optimize the price levels at each step 354 
so that the total net economic benefit of water use is maximized (“optimal” step pricing policy). 355 
For that purpose, the prices were optimized with non-linear programming, using as starting 356 
values the prices from the averaged MROC values. Fig. 6 shows that the optimal step pricing 357 
policy is closer to the one from MROC-simulation than to MROC-optimization, what confirms 358 
the fact that better economic results were obtained using the former pricing policy. Other 359 
basinwide pricing policies have been also tested with the aim of better approximate the variability 360 
of the MROC time series using different explanatory variables. 361 
Step pricing depending on previous inflows 362 
The MROC at a certain location and time depends not only on water availability (storage) in the 363 
system, but also on the coming reservoir inflows and the evolution of the scarcity conditions. In 364 
order to introduce this in the design of a pricing policy, the last-year annual inflow to the 365 
reservoir was included in the definition of the step pricing function, using the averaged MROC-366 
optimization as the starting point. Analyzing the droughts in the historical inflow time series 367 
through the “run theory” (Dracup et al. 1980) with the mean annual inflow as the threshold, ten 368 
droughts events were found during the historical period, with an average duration of 3.1 years. 369 
Most drought episodes are multiannual, what corresponds to a time series with a significant 370 
autocorrelation over time.  Close to the mean magnitude of the droughts, 100 Mm
3
 was used as 371 
the lowest threshold for the inflow categorization, and the MROC values from optimization were 372 
averaged for each inflow interval. The resulting inflow-dependent pricing function (Fig. 7) was 373 
tested and compared against the other pricing policies. 374 
Annual constant pricing policy depending on initial storage and previous annual flow 375 
The information provided by the previous inflows and the status of the system reserves can be 376 
used as a tool for predicting future flows and drought forecasting, in order to achieve an efficient 377 
hedging operation of the reservoirs with anticipation to droughts (Ochoa-Rivera et al. 2007). To 378 
include this issue in the design of an efficient pricing policy, the pricing steps were defined as 379 
dependent on the annual inflow in the first and even the second previous year and the available 380 
storage at a certain month, according to the following equation: 381 
               pyear(t) = a + b·Voct + c ·Qyear(t-1) + d ·(Qyear(t-1) + Qyear(t-2))  (1) 382 
where pyear is the constant price for that year, Voct is the initial storage for October (the starting of 383 
the irrigation season), Qyear are the inflow values in the last and the year before the last, and a, b, 384 
c, and d are parameters calibrated so that the time series of the resulting prices gets as close as 385 
possible to the MROC time series. 386 
Seasonal pricing depending on initial storage and previous annual flow 387 
With the purpose of reflecting the variation of the MROC for the same storage volumes 388 
depending on whether scarcity is growing or decreasing over time, the price has also been 389 
dependent on the previous status of the system in the precedent seasonal period. The adjusted 390 
functions are:   391 
 poct-april = a + b·Voct + c ·Qapr,year(t-1)  ( 2) 392 
 papr-sept = d + e·Vapr + f ·Qoct,year(t-1)  (3) 393 
where poct-april and papril-sept are the seasonal prices, Vapr is the initial storage for April and Vapr for 394 
October, Qapr, year(t-1) and Qoct,year(t-1) are the inflow values corresponding to the last April and  395 
October, and a, b, c, d, e, and f are parameters calibrated to approximate the MROC time series. 396 
Testing price efficiency with synthetic inflow time series 397 
Although it is usual to adopt a deterministic approach in the analysis of water resource systems 398 
and simulate for the historical flow records, these series represent just a single realization of the 399 
infinite number of likely future hydrologic scenarios. But the future sequence of flows will not be 400 
the historical one. The generation of multiple synthetic hydrologic time series that statistically 401 
resemble the historical one allows us to address the issue of uncertain future inflows by providing 402 
a broader range of equally likely flow sequences for testing alternative policies. The use of 403 
synthetic streamflows improves the precision with which performance indices can be estimated; 404 
this is particularly useful for water resources with large amounts of over-year storage (Loucks 405 
and van Beek 2005). Fifty synthetic time series have been generated using a classic stochastic 406 
ARMA model and applied to test whether the resulting benefits (averaged through the synthetic 407 
scenarios) were consistent with the value for the historical record.  408 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 409 
In this particular case, the step pricing function derived from the averaged MROC-Simulation for 410 
each storage interval leads to total benefits quite close to those from the economic optimization 411 
 (Table 2). The simulation of this pricing policy indicates an increase in economic benefits that 412 
capture 80% of the gap of total net benefits between management without pricing and the 413 
economically optimal management. Although these pricing policies were derived from the 414 
average values of MROC at each interval, other statistical measures of central tendency (e.g., the 415 
mode, the median) could be tested. The step pricing function derived from the averaged MROC 416 
from optimization (shadow values) led to a lower economic efficiency. The optimized storage-417 
dependent step pricing did not improve much the economic efficiency either. Thus, the MROC 418 
time series at the reservoir has been useful for designing an economically efficient basinwide 419 
water pricing policy. For this particular example, despite the advantage of the practical simplicity 420 
of an annually constant pricing policy at the beginning of the hydrological year and the security 421 
for the users’ decisions, total net benefits are not as high as the ones corresponding to the storage-422 
dependent pricing policy. The two seasonal pricing functions depending on both inflow and 423 
storage yielded almost the same benefit, but in any case, lower than for the storage-dependent 424 
step pricing. The long persistence of the historical flow time series (Fig. 2) produces long over-425 
year droughts, so that the seasonal variation is not so significant in terms of water scarcity. The 426 
inflow-dependent pricing function (classified by inflow thresholds) produced greater benefits 427 
than the priority-based simulation (actually, all pricing policies did, since these policies translate 428 
a component of the marginal opportunity cost into water management), but lower than for the 429 
storage-dependent step pricing.  430 
From this analysis we can deduce some recommendations for designing efficient basinwide 431 
pricing policies. First, the MROC time series are calculated by simulating water management in 432 
the system with the existing operating rules (priority-based simulation). If possible, an 433 
optimization model can be implemented to maximize the economic benefit of water use in the 434 
basin over time and across the competing uses. The results of this model provide an upper bound 435 
of the benefit that can be achieved with an efficient pricing policy. Then, a step pricing policy is 436 
defined as a function of available storage, using average MROC values for the range of storage 437 
volumes of the corresponding step. By comparing the resulting total benefit from the pricing 438 
policy with the one corresponding to the economic optimum, the pricing policy can be proposed 439 
or further refined. The use of pricing policies depending on the previous status of the system or 440 
annual or seasonal price functions make the calculation more complex; in this particular case, 441 
these policies did not imply a substantial improvement of the benefits from water use. But this is 442 
only confirmed for this particular case, and it can be different in other cases. In any case, all these 443 
policies represent an increase in net benefits as compared to the traditional water allocation 444 
 system based on priorities. Finally, multiple synthetic flow time series are used to check how 445 
robust the calculation of the expected benefits is.   446 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 447 
This paper presents a new method for the simulation of different water pricing policies linked to 448 
water availability (or relative scarcity) in a river basin and the design of efficient water pricing 449 
policies including the marginal value of the resource at the basin scale, based on the use of 450 
basinwide hydro-economic models. Storage-based water pricing policies are simulated by 451 
dynamically changing the target demands according to the price level that corresponds to the 452 
storage at the reservoir. The design of efficient pricing policies is based on the assessment of the 453 
marginal resource opportunity cot (MROC) as the value for the system of an additional unit of 454 
water at a certain location and time. The MROC time series can be estimated for the existing 455 
priorities and modus operandi (priority-based simulation) or by the shadow values of the balance 456 
constraints when water is allocated to maximize the total net benefit in water use (economic 457 
optimization). The improvement in economic efficiency was assessed by comparing the results 458 
from the simulation of the current system operation and from the pricing schedule. The distance 459 
between the benefits from the simulated current management to the maximum benefits from 460 
optimization indicates the maximum profit gap that could be bridged with pricing. 461 
In the application to a synthetic case, a step pricing schedule derived from average MROC values 462 
from simulation led to economic benefits that capture 80% of the gap of net benefits between 463 
management without pricing and the economically optimal management. Different pricing 464 
policies depending not only on storage but also on previous inflow have been tested. The relative 465 
efficiency of the different pricing policies depends on many factors inherent to the complexity of 466 
the system such as the economic demand functions, the time-dependent structure of the inflow 467 
time series and the statistical droughts properties, the configuration and infrastructure of the 468 
system, the regulatory capacity, etc. The results show that the method is useful for designing 469 
efficient pricing policies that enhance economic benefits and lead to more efficient resource 470 
allocations over time and across the different competing uses of the system. Even though the 471 
absolute increase in net benefits for the particular example presented is not so high, the method is 472 
totally generalizable and could yield much larger improvements in other water resources systems, 473 
especially when dealing with marked water scarcity conditions, competing uses with important 474 
differences in economic value, and significant economic inefficiencies derived from the existing 475 
water allocation policies.     476 
 Although economically efficient prices should incorporate the marginal value at the source 477 
(MROC), these prices are not necessarily the prices that water consumers should be charged. The 478 
final prices can be a matter of social or national policy (Fisher et al. 2002). Other important 479 
pricing goals apart from economic efficiency, as revenue sufficiency and neutrality, equity, or 480 
environmental sustainability should be also considered. The literature on the analysis of these 481 
pricing issues at the basin scale is still very scarce (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008 and 2009). 482 
Environmental restrictions can be addressed by imposing minimum ecological flow constraints in 483 
the models and analyzing the implications for water pricing. Equity can be also addressed in 484 
different ways, although the extent to which water pricing methods can affect income 485 
redistribution is limited (e.g. Tsur and Dinar, 1995, for the agricultural sector). Measures taken to 486 
guarantee access to water should not be confused with income redistribution, a function that is 487 
typically reserved for the fiscal instruments, including general taxes (Griffin, 2001). From the 488 
different ways to promote equity, efficiency, and sustainability in water management, water 489 
pricing is probably the simplest conceptually, but maybe the most difficult to implement 490 
politically (Rogers et al. 1998). 491 
Stochastic dynamic programming is an alternative for determining the marginal value of water in 492 
a reservoir (e.g. Tilmant et al. 2008), with the advantage over deterministic optimization 493 
techniques that it explicitly considers the effect of hydrologic uncertainty on the results. In this 494 
case, however, the aim was to develop a general method that can be applied in practice to any 495 
complex system with available generalized DSS tools. In this sense, most DSS tools are based on 496 
network flow optimization for dealing with multiperiod multireservoir large complex systems 497 
(eg, Labadie, 1995; Andreu et al., 1996; Jenkins et al., 2004). In any case, the “deterministic 498 
optimization” is used in our approach just to assess the efficiency gap between current 499 
management and perfect profit-maximizing water allocation and to help develop efficient water 500 
pricing policies based on average MROC (also alternatively developed with simulation MROC 501 
values). The effect of each pricing policy under uncertain future inflows is then assessed through 502 
simulation, avoiding the perfect foresight issue of optimization and obtaining more realistic costs 503 
and benefits. Given the unavoidable uncertainty regarding the different inputs of the model, the 504 
issue of the uncertainty associated with the model predictions about the impacts of the pricing 505 
policies would need to be further explored in a comprehensive way over a broad number of 506 
model inputs.  507 
Some tools have been  prepared for the practical implementation of the method with GAMS and 508 
new modules for the DSS AQUATOOL. River basin simulation models are already available in 509 
 AQUATOOL for several Spanish river basins, some developed in the context of the new River 510 
Basin Plans for the implementation of the EU WFD (Paredes-Arquiola et al. 2010). Once the 511 
economic characterization of water uses in the basin is available, the approach is ready to be 512 
extended to more complex real cases. For the practical use of the approach in the implementation 513 
of the WFD, further research is needed on issues as the contribution of pricing policies to the 514 
good status of water bodies (Riegels et al. this issue) and  the integration of the financial, 515 
resource, and environmental components of the cost of water services.  516 
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Table 1. Benefits and mean annual deficits for simulation and optimization 
Approach Benefit A Benefit B Mean total Mean  Mean  
 (M€/year) (M€/year) Benefit deficit A deficit B 
   (M€/year) (Mm3/year) (Mm3/year) 
ECONOMIC 
OPTIMIZATION 
25,49 28,05 53,54 10,85 2,94 
PRIORITY-BASED 
SIMULATION 
26,05 25,38 51,43 4,21 9,04 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 2. Comparison of annual benefits for different pricing policies. Historical vs. synthetic inflow time series. 
Approach 
Benefit A 
(M€/year)  
Benefit B 
(M€/year) 
Total Benefit * 
(M€/year) 
Total benefit,  
synthetic (M€/year)** 
ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION 25,49 28,05 53,54 53,99 
PRIORITY-BASED SIMULATION 26,05 25,38 51,43 52,51 
STORAGE-DEPENDENT STEP PRICING 
Based on MROC-SIMULATION  25,34 27,73 53,07 53,57 
Based on MROC-OPTIMIZATION 25,78 26,90 52,68 52,46 
Optimized storage-dependent step pricing 25,24 27,87 53,11 53,57 
Inflow-dependent step pricing 25.60 27.11 52.71 52.91 
ANNUAL CONSTANT PRICING 
Based on MROC-OPTIMIZATION 25,60 27,01 52,61 53,24 
Based on MROC-SIMULATION 25,90 26,35 52,25 51,37 
SEASONAL PRICING based on storage and previous inflows 
Based on MROC-OPTIMIZATION 25,71 26,91 52,62 53,31 
Based on MROC-SIMULATION 24,76 27,58 52,34 53,00 
* Based on the historical flow records   ** Average value across generated synthetic inflow scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
